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CocciaLab Working Paper 2018 -No. 34/bis period (Matesanz and Ortega, 2015; cf. also, Buiatti et al., 2014; Alesina, 1988 for Italian case study). Other countries, such as Germany and Austria have experienced softer deterioration on their public debt positions, whereas Norway has experienced a reduction in its public debt stock (Matesanz and Ortega, 2015) . Neaime (2015, p. 2) argues that the accumulated EU's national debts are the result of both economic and political/institutional factors. Baxter (1871) is one of the first scholars that analyzed the evolution of public debts across European countries and the pressure of public debt upon the population. Baxter (1871, p. 48) argued, about countries of the Southern Europe, that:
the history of the debts of the Latin nations…their people are careful and frugal, but their rulers are too often reckless and spendthrift, prone to overspend their income in time of peace and still more largely in time of war; … and sometimes unable to pay even the interest. Perhaps their tendency to arbitrary and therefore irresponsible government has too much to do with the succession of deficits Current public debt histories of some countries seem to be similar to those of about 150 years ago described by Baxter (1871) . As a matter of fact, the recent high debts and financial crises of some countries have generated damages on European and world economy due to weak and unstable public sectors' finances. Sargent (2012) claims that the high sovereign debt can contribute to maintain persistently high unemployment in Europe (cf., . Policy makers and economists have thus been recently devoting efforts in trying to predict financial and debt crises before they occur, given the potential damage on several economic systems. In particular, in the presence of debt crises in Europe, the solvency of some European countries has become a major source of concern for the European Union (EU) as a whole, which is endangering its financial/economic integration efforts, and the successful monetary unification. In addition, some scholars suggest that austerity measures of countries may not resolve the problem of high public debts and should be accompanied with other political/institutional corrective measures (Coccia, 2017i, 2013 . Matesanz and Ortega (2015, p. 757 countries' public debts tend to synchronize their changes, increasing global synchronization and hence dramatically decreasing the number of communities in the network.… as a result . . . a homogenization in the member's comovements, producing in this way a network topological organization highly susceptible to spread the effects of the crisis among the countries. Finally, at the onset of the financial crisis the new network arrangement that appears seems to be directly related to the debt-to-GDP level itself which clearly puts into difficulties for controlling the public debt dynamic.
Many studies have focused on determinants of sovereign debt defaults, the implied interest rates paid on sovereign debt and impact of high public debt on patterns of economic growth (Elgin and Uras, 2013; Barro, 1974; Dell'Erba et al., 2013; Modigliani, 1961 ). Other studies have investigated possible non-linear relations between public debt and growth as well as discussed to what extent debt accumulation has a detrimental and causal effect on GDP growth (see, Panizza and Presbitero, 2014) . Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) pointed out that public debt as a share of GDP may have a detrimental effect on the rate of growth of real GDP; in particular, public debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 90%, can slow down economic growth considerably (cf. also . Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) find some support for a negative relationship between public debt and long-run growth of countries (cf., Égert, 2015) . In addition, endogenous growth models suggest that public debt has generally a negative effect on long-run growth (Barro, 1990) . In particular, high public debt can limit the effectiveness of productive public expenditures on long-run growth (Teles and Mussolini, 2014) , create uncertainty or expectations of future financial repression (Cochrane, 2011) , and increase sovereign yield spreads (Codogno et al., 2003) leading to higher real interest rates and lower private investment (Laubach, 2009) .
Economic literature considers different approaches to limit government deficit and public debt, based on Neoclassical, Keynesian and Ricardian School of economics. Many studies analyzed the way how government budget deficits should be financed: e.g., by increasing taxes and/or by issuing new debt (Gogas et al., 2014; Eichengreen and Panizza, 2016) . Teles and Mussolini (2014, p. 1 ) propose a theoretical model of endogenous 6 | P a g e National debts and government deficits within European Monetary Union: Statistical evidence of economic issues Working Paper 2018 -No. 34/bis growth that show how the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio can negatively impact the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This effect occurs because government indebtedness extracts a portion of young people's savings to pay interest on debts. Therefore, the payment of debt interest requires an allocation exchange system across generations. Moreover, the large amount of debt across most developed countries also raises the discussion that cutting taxes should take into account. Although a tax cut is expected to improve longrun situation, it will undoubtedly lead to a worsening of the short-run debt situation. Tsuchiya (2016) suggests that an economy with a higher population growth has more room for a tax cut while satisfying its long-run government budget constraint. The dynamic effect of a tax cut improves the government budget situation in the long run but it is likely that low population growth leads to the deterioration of a long-run government budget.
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Concerning the solution of issuing new debt, Stasavage (2016) argues that states had the best access to credit when institutions gave government creditors privileged access to decision making, while restricting the influence of those who paid the taxes to reimburse debts. This situation sometimes does not improve the welfare of countries and create latent social and political issues.
Several governments and institutions in Europe, in order to reduce large government deficits, expenses and high public debts of nations, support specific measures and austerity programs based on Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact, the new Fiscal Compact in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the creation of fiscal policy committees, etc. (Gnegne and Jawadi, 2013) . However, the precise effect of these measures on the evolution of public debt across different economic systems in Europe, in the presence of financial turmoil and market turbulence, is uncertain and hardly known. The main aim of this article is to analyze the evolution of public debt and fiscal deficits across countries within and outside European Monetary Unification, during the period preceding and successive the introduction of the Euro currency. Results can provide insights on recent trends of public debt to support an appropriate political economy of growth. 
Materials and methods

Measures
Macroeconomic variables under study, considering the dataset by Eurostat (2016) , are:
 General government gross debt as a % of the GDP  General government deficit/surplus as a % of the GDP  Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. as a % of the GDP  Taxes on production and imports as a % of the GDP  General government fixed investment as a % of the GDP  Total unemployment rate %  Crude rate of natural change per 1000 persons Data are over 1995 period (Eurostat, 2016 .
Data Analyses and Procedures
Countries analyzed in this study are divided in two clubs: This study endeavors to support this HP with statistical evidence.
In particular, a preliminary analysis is performed with trends and bar graphs considering the arithmetic mean of variables across countries within and outside European Monetary Union, before and after the introduction of the Euro Currency.
The main statistical analysis is performed with regression analysis, by applying the linear model as follows: Countries outside European Monetary Union) in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence of significant difference of arithmetic means between these two clubs of countries.
In particular, before and after the introduction of Euro currency, the null hypothesis (H 0 ) and alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) of the independent samples T test are given by: In addition, Table 1 period, public debts are increasing in the presence of a deterioration of unemployment rate. These negative effects are combined with increases of taxes on income and reductions of growth rates of population (c.f., Tsuchiya, 2016; . In short, in the presence of these demographic, economic, fiscal and labor dynamics, a future scenario for several European countries might be a possible deterioration of structural indicators with negative effects on the European economy as a whole. Corsetti et al., 2010) .
The high sovereign debt for some European countries contributes to maintain persistently high unemployment, low economic growth and stability of Europe as a whole (Sargent, 2012; . As a matter of fact, public debt is a complex economic issue and governments should limit public spending (Barro, 1979) . Tabellini and Alesina (1990, p. 37) argue that governments choose, a priori, a non-optimal debt policy by budget deficits, because of disagreement between current and future majorities (such as in Italy). Corsetti et al. (2010, p. 45, original emphasis) claim that:
consolidation efforts are likely to include not only tax increases but also sizeable spending cuts. . . . analysis suggests that such prospective spending cuts generally enhance the expansionary effect of current fiscal stimulus.
Austerity packages, balanced-budget rules and high taxation for public debt reductions in some European countries (e.g., in Greece, Italy, France, etc.) seem to negatively affect the dynamics of economic growth and public debt /GDP ratio over time, in particular in the presence of business cycle contractions and economic turmoil (cf., Afonso and Jalles, 2013; . Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997, pp. 976) argue that:
A traditional argument against a balanced-budget fiscal policy rule is that it amplifies business cycles by stimulating aggregate demand during booms via tax cuts and higher public expenditures and by reducing demand during recessions through a corresponding fiscal contraction. … an additional source of instability that may arise from this type of fiscal policy rule…, a balanced budget rule can make expectations of higher tax rates self-fulfilling if the fiscal authority relies heavily on changes in labor income taxes to eliminate short-run fiscal imbalances.
In fact, balanced-budget rule can be a source of economic instability and this result is confirmed in presence of high public debt that could remain constant and/or increase over time, such as in some European countries over 2005 period (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997 Stockman, 2010) . Several studies do not suggest for governments a balanced-budget rule, since it affects (narrows) the political economy of driving surplus and deficits, by borrowing and lending, to smooth taxes. In addition, "the welfare consequences of decreasing ratio 21 | P a g e of debt/output at the exogenous growth rate are negligible" (Stockman, 2001, p. 439) . Stockman (2004, p. 382) also claims that:
a balanced-budget rule limits the ability to smooth taxes, rendering a large class of competitive equilibria not compatible with a government honoring its debt obligations. The reputation model predicts default as the equilibrium outcome under a balanced-budget restriction.
Although the reduction of sovereign debt of some European countries is a desirable goal for economic stability of European Monetary Unification, it is not an easy task and should be pursued by long-run economic policies, considering fluctuations of business cycles and demographic dynamics of population, to support steady-state patterns of economic growth. Europe has focused on downsizing of the ratio of public debt to GDP by higher taxation for population and balanced-budget rules for member countries. However, E.U. political economy of the Stability Pact and Fiscal Compact, in the presence of declining average rates of natural change of population, seems to generate negative effects for long-run patterns of economic growth, shaking the stability of countries and Europe to its foundations . Antonucci and Pianta (2002, p. 306) argue that:
"macroeconomic constraints of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe have put a serious limit on the economic dynamics of national economies, and of manufacturing industries in particular". De Grauwe and Fratianni (1983, p. 53) show that: "draw from the evidence . . . higher tax rates are not likely to reduce budget deficits in the long run. They may in fact increase them". As a matter of fact, results of the study here show in general that stability programmes of the European Monetary Unification seem to have deteriorated the evolution of public debts of some countries, in presence of economic turmoil and demographic crisis. Some economists show that similar rules may not be optimal policy and may generate aggregate instability, considering the initial high level of the public debt in countries (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997; Stockman, 2010) . Stockman (2004, p. 383) points out that: "The ability to borrow is desirable because debt serves as a buffer to help smooth distortionary taxes over time resulting in higher economic welfare". Overall, then, as government consolidated gross debt is measured by the ratio government debt / GDP, an appropriate political economy of growth to reduce public debt over the long run may be to support the GDP growth (denominator of the ratio) with investments and other expansionary economic policies, rather than reduce the numerator (i.e., public debt) by higher taxation of people, also during recessions. In fact, Baxter (1871, p. 122) argued, considering England, that: "the nation by its rapid growth is constantly diminishing its burden. In the peace between 1815 and 1870 England has diminished the pressure of her debt from 9 per cent to less than 3 per cent, principally by her natural growth and increase".
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Concluding observations
This study shows some observed economic facts concerning the evolution of public debts and fiscal deficits in Economic and Monetary Union that negatively affect the evolution of public debt and fiscal deficit across several European countries in the presence of economic turmoil and low average growth rates of population.
d) Finally, one future scenario in Europe might be that current problematic evolution of economic and demographic factors can negatively affect the performance of public debt, employment and economic growth paths for many years to come.
In general, economic theory suggests that balanced-budget rule may not be optimal policy considering the high initial level of public debts in several European countries (cf., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997; Stockman, 2010) . Bruno (1992, p. 204) 
